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A haraterization of a new value and an existing value for oop-
erative games with levels struture of ooperation
Abstrat: We present parallel haraterizations of two dierent values in the
framework of restrited ooperation games. The restritions are introdued
as a nite sequene of partitions dened on the player set, eah of them being
oarser than the previous one, hene forming a struture of dierent levels
of a priori unions. On the one hand, we onsider a value rst introdued
by [18℄, whih extends the Shapley value to games with dierent levels of a
priori unions. On the other hand, we introdue another solution for the same
type of games, whih extends the Banzhaf value in the same manner. We
haraterize these two values in terms of easily omparable sets of properties
and we illustrate them by means of an example.
Keywords: Shapley value, Banzhaf value, levels struture of ooperation
JEL Classiation: C71
Resum: En aquest treball presentem dues arateritzaions de dos valors
diferents en el mar dels jos oaliionals amb ooperaió restringida. Les re-
striions són introduïdes om una seqüènia nita de partiions del onjunt
de jugadors, de manera que ada una d'elles és més grollera que l'anterior,
formant així una estrutura amb diferents nivells d'unions a priori. Per una
banda, onsiderem el valor introduït per [18℄, que extèn el valor de Shapley
a jos amb diferents nivells d'unions a priori. D'altra banda, introduïm una
altra soluió, que extèn el valor de Banzhaf de manera similar. Carater-
izem els dos valors anteriors en termes de onjunts de propietats fàilment
omparables lògiament i els ilustrem a partir d'un exemple.
1 Introdution
Transferable utility ooperative games (just games from now on) are used
to desribe situations in whih agents ooperate to obtain some gains, e.g.
building a road to onnet a number of towns or reahing an agreement
to pass a bill. These gains are assumed to be divisible and transferable
among players without any loss. The problem of alloating the gains that
the ooperation generates among the players is one of the main topis takled
in the literature. Therefore, assessing the strategi position of eah player
in a given game is ruial in order to nd a share-out that respets to some
extent the power of eah player. The Shapley value [15℄ is the best known
onept in this respet, together with the Banzhaf value [6, 12℄.
In the original model where both the Shapley value and the Banzhaf
value are typially used there is no restrition to the ooperation, and the
game is dened by the worth that any oalition an obtain by its own.
However, there are many real situations in whih there is a priori information
about the behavior of the players or there are environmental restritions and
only partial ooperation ours. Dierent approahes have been used to
address this type of situations and dierent models of games with restrited
ooperation have been studied. In partiular, players may form oalitions
and these oalitions may bargain for the division of the worth of the grand
oalition. [5℄ suppose that the restritions to the ooperation are given by a
partition of the set of players. The model with both a game and a partition of
the set of players is alled a game with a priori unions. For these games, [13℄
proposes and haraterizes the Owen value, an extension of the Shapley value
[15℄ to alloate the gains generated by the grand oalition. Following a similar
proedure, in a subsequent paper [14℄ denes an extension of the Banzhaf
value [12℄ known as the Banzhaf-Owen value. The rst haraterization of
this solution onept is presented in [4℄. [2℄ give parallel haraterizations of
the two aforementioned values whih eases the omparison between them.
[18℄ takes one step beyond by introduing games with levels struture
of ooperation, whih extends the model of games with a priori unions. He
proposes and haraterizes an extension of the Owen value for this kind of
situations, whih we will all the Shapley levels value. As before, players
are assumed to be organized in unions as pressure groups for the division of
the worth available (rst level of ooperation). Nevertheless, this time the
formed unions may again organize themselves in larger groups (seond level of
ooperation) while they maintain their internal obligations of the rst level,
and so on and so forth. Hene, this time the restritions to the ooperation
are desribed by a sequene of partitions of the player set, eah of them
2
being oarser than the previous ones. [7℄ give an alternative haraterization
of the Shapley levels value using a balaned ontributions property and [17℄
implement the Shapley levels value in a subgame perfet equilibrium of a
partiular bidding mehanism.
In the present paper, we rst propose an extension of the Banzhaf-
Owen value for games with levels struture of ooperation, whih we all
the Banzhaf levels value. Next, we provide two parallel haraterizations of
both the Shapley levels value and the Banzhaf levels value whih reveals the
dierenes between both solution onepts. On the one hand, the Shapley
levels value is haraterized using the level game property and the level bal-
aned ontributions property. The level game property states that in eah
level, the sum of the payos of the players of any union equals the payo
of the same union when onsidering it as a player in the orresponding level
game. The level balaned ontributions is a reiproity property that as-
serts that the hange on the payo of a player aused by the isolation of
another player of her same union of the rst level remains invariant if we
permute both players. A similar property is used in [7℄, but in this ase the
player set is assumed to hange. On the other hand, the haraterization
of the Banzhaf levels value is based on the singleton level game property
and the level neutrality under individual desertion property. The singleton
level game property is the restrition of the level game property to singleton
unions of a given level, whereas the level neutrality under individual deser-
tion property states that the payo of a player is not aeted by the isolation
of another player in her same union of the rst level. Hene, level neutral-
ity under individual desertion implies level balaned ontributions and level
game property implies singleton level game property and thus the main prop-
erties used to haraterize eah of the two values are logially related, whih
eases the omparison between the two values.
There is a variety of reasons to seek for parallel axiomatizations of two
dierent values using a minimal set of logially related properties. In the
rst plae, from a mathematially point of view, haraterizing a value using
a few independent properties may be more appealing than just giving an
expliit formula or proedure to alulate it. In the seond plae, deiding
on whether to use a value or not an be made more easily using a set of
properties instead of a formula. Lastly, depending on the framework, one
set of properties or another shall t better, and hene one value or the other
shall be used.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Setion 2 is mainly devoted
to present the model of games with levels struture of ooperation, and
in partiular the Shapley levels value introdued by [18℄. In Setion 3 we
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dene the Banzhaf levels value. In Setion 4 we introdue and explain some
properties that a value for games with levels struture of ooperation might
satisfy, and we provide a haraterization for eah of the two aforementioned
values. Setion 5 onludes with an example.
2 Preliminaries
An n-person ooperative game with transferable utility (a game) is a pair
(N, v), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the nite set of players and v, the harater-
isti funtion, is a real valued funtion on 2N = {S|S ⊆ N} with v(∅) = 0.
We denote by GN the set of games with player set N . For eah S ⊆ N and
i ∈ N we will write S ∪ i instead S ∪ {i} and S \ i instead S \ {i}.
Given (N, v) ∈ GN , a player i ∈ N is a dummy if v(S ∪ i) = v(S) + v(i)
for all S ⊆ N \ i, that is, if all her marginal ontributions are equal to v(i).
A player i ∈ N is alled a null player if she is a dummy and v(i) = 0. Two
players i, j ∈ N are symmetri if v(S ∪ i) = v(S ∪ j) for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j},
that is, if their marginal ontributions to eah oalition oinide.
A value on GN is a map f that assigns to every game (N, v) ∈ GN a ve-
tor f(N, v) ∈ Rn. The following denitions provide the expliit expressions
of two well-known values in the literature.
Denition 2.1. [15℄ Given a game (N, v), the Shapley value, φ, is a vetor
in Rn where eah oordinate is dened as follows:
φi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\i
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
[v(S ∪ i)− v(S)] , for every i ∈ N,
where s = |S| and n = |N |.1
Denition 2.2. [6, 12℄ Given a game (N, v), the Banzhaf value, ψ, is a
vetor in Rn where eah oordinate is dened as follows:
ψi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\i
1
2n−1
[v(S ∪ i)− v(S)] , for every i ∈ N.
We denote by P(N) the set of all partitions of a nite set of players N ,
and for eah P ∈ P(N) and eah S ⊆ N , P|S ∈ P(S) is the partition of S
indued by P , i.e., P|S = {U ∩ S : U ∈ P}. A levels struture of ooperation
is a pair (N,B), where N is the set of players and B = {B0, . . . , Bk} is a
1
We use the | · | operator to denote the ardinality of a nite set.
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sequene of partitions of N suh that B0 = {{i} : i ∈ N} and, for eah
r ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, Br+1 is oarser than Br. That is to say, for eah r ∈
{1, . . . , k} and eah S ∈ Br, there is B ⊆ Br−1 suh that S = ∪U∈BU . Eah
S ∈ Br is alled a union and Br is alled the r-th level of B. We denote
by L(N) the set of all levels strutures of ooperation over the set N . The
following example illustrates the above denitions.
Example 2.3. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and B = {B0, B1, B2} be a levels
struture of ooperation over N with two levels, where
B2 = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}},
B1 = {{1, 2}, {3}, {4}, {5, 6}}, and
B0 = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}, {6}}.
A ooperative game with levels struture of ooperation is a triple (N, v,B),
where (N, v) ∈ GN and (N,B) ∈ L(N). We denote by GLN the set of all o-
operative games with levels struture of ooperation. Given (N,B) ∈ L(N)
with B = {B0, . . . , Bk} and i ∈ N , (N,B
−i) ∈ L(N) is the levels struture
of ooperation obtained from (N,B) by isolating player i from the union
she belongs to at eah level, i.e., B−i = {B−i0 , . . . , B
−i
k }, where, for all
r ∈ {0, . . . , k}, B−ir = {U ∈ Br : i /∈ U} ∪ {S \ i, {i}} given that i ∈ S ∈ Br.
Note that B−i0 = B0. For eah r ∈ {1, . . . , k} and eah U ∈ Br, [U ] de-
notes U onsidered as a player at level r, whereas [Br] denotes the set of
players at level r, i.e, [Br] = {[U ] : U ∈ Br} and ([Br], Br) ∈ GL
[Br ]
, where
Br = {Br, . . . , Bk}. Given (N, v,B) ∈ GL
N
with B = {B0, . . . , Bk}, for
eah r ∈ {0, . . . , k} we dene the r-th level game ([Br], v
r, Br) ∈ GL
[Br ]
as
the game indued from (N, v) by onsidering the oalitions of Br as players,
i.e., vr([U ]) = v(U) for eah r ∈ {0, . . . , k} and eah U ∈ Br.
In the framework of games with levels struture of ooperation we assume
that players are initially organized into the oalition struture Bk as pressure
groups for the division of v(N). Then, eah union of the last level is divided
again aording to the oalition struture Bk−1 as pressure group for the
division of the amount that the unions of the last level have obtained, and
so on and so forth until the last level, B0, is reahed.
A value on GLN is a map f that assigns to every game with levels
struture of ooperation (N, v,B) ∈ GLN a vetor f(N, v,B) ∈ Rn. We
denote by Π(N) the set of permutations of N , and given pi ∈ Π(N), piB =
{piB0, . . . , piBk}, where piBk = {piS1, . . . , piSp} given that Bk = {S1, . . . , Sp},
and piv(S) = v(pi−1S). Consider the following properties that a value on
GLN may satisfy:
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• A value f on GLN satises eieny if for all (N, v,B) ∈ GLN ,∑
i∈N
fi(N, v,B) = v(N).
• A value f on GLN satises additivity if for all (N, v,B), (N,w,B) ∈
GLN ,
f(N, v + w,B) = f(N, v,B) + f(N,w,B).
• A value f on GLN satises individual symmetry if for all (N, v,B) ∈
GLN and eah pi ∈ Π(N),
pif(N, v,B) = f(piN, piv, piB).
• A value f on GLN satises oalitional symmetry if for all (N, v,B) ∈
GLN and eah level r ∈ {1, · · · , k}, if [S], [U ] ∈ [Br] are symmetri
players in the game ([Br], v
r) and S,U are subsets of the same union
in Bl for eah l > r, then∑
i∈S
fi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈U
fi(N, v,B).
• A value f on GLN satises the null player property if for all (N, v,B) ∈
GLN suh that i ∈ N is a null player for the game (N, v),
fi(N, v,B) = 0.
The above ve properties are natural extensions of the properties used
in [13℄ within the framework of GLN .
Next, let the sets Ω(B) = Ω1(B) ⊆ Ω2(B) ⊆ · · · ⊆ Ωk(B) ⊆ Π(N)
dened as follows. First of all,
Ωk(B) = {σ ∈ Π(N) : ∀S ∈ Bk, ∀i, j ∈ S ∈ Bk and l ∈ N,
if σ(i) < σ(l) < σ(j) then l ∈ S}.
Then, for r ∈ {k − 1, . . . , 1} we reursively dene
Ωr(B) = {σ ∈ Ωr+1(B) : ∀i, j ∈ S ∈ Br and l ∈ N,
if σ(i) < σ(l) < σ(j) then l ∈ S}.
Hene, Ωr(B) denotes the permutations of Ωr+1(B) suh that the ele-
ments of eah union of Br are onseutive. Let us see an example to illustrate
the above denitions.
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Example 2.4. For the levels struture of ooperation of Example 2.3, |Ω2(B)| =
72, |Ω1(B)| = 36, (1, 2, 4, 3, 5, 6) /∈ Ω2(B), (1, 3, 2, 4, 5, 6) ∈ Ω2(B) \ Ω1(B)
and (3, 2, 1, 5, 6, 4) ∈ Ω1(B).
Next, we reall the denition of the already known solution onept for
games with levels struture of ooperation.
Denition 2.5. Given a game with levels struture of ooperation (N, v,B) ∈
GLN , the Shapley levels value [18℄, Φ, is a vetor in Rn where eah oordinate
is dened as follows:
Φi(N, v,B) =
1
|Ω(B)|
∑
σ∈Ω(B)
(v(P σi ∪ i)− v(P
σ
i )),
where P σi = {j ∈ N : σ(j) < σ(i)} is the set of predeessors of i at σ.
[18℄ haraterizes the Shapley levels value using the above ve properties.
Theorem 2.6. [18℄ The Shapley levels value is the unique value on GLN
satisfying eieny, additivity, individual symmetry, oalitional symmetry,
and the null player property.
3 A new value on GLN
In this setion we introdue a new value on GLN that oinides with the
Banzhaf-Owen value [14℄ when the levels struture of ooperation has just
one level, i.e., when B = {B0, B1}. The idea for dening this new value is
to indue, for eah player, a partition of the set of players that respets the
restritions of the levels struture of ooperation. In other words, instead of
looking at whih permutations are feasible for the given levels struture, as
in [18℄, for eah player we look at whih oalitions are feasible for the given
levels struture of ooperation.
Given a levels struture of ooperation (N,B) ∈ L(N), for eah player
i ∈ N , let i ∈ U0 = {i} ⊆ U1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Uk suh that Ur ∈ Br for all
r ∈ {0, . . . , k}. Then, the partition indued by B on i is dened as follows,
P (i, B) =
k⋃
r=0
(Br)|Ur+1\Ur ,
where Uk+1 = N by onveniene. Then, P (i, B) ∈ P(N \ i). We denote
|P (i, B)| by mi, and the unions of the partition indued by B, by P (i, B) =
{T1, . . . , Tmi}. Finally the set of indies of the partition indued by B is
denoted by Mi = {1, . . . ,mi} whih an be seen as the set of representatives
of the unions of P (i, B).
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Example 3.1. For the levels struture of ooperation of Example 2.3 we have,
for instane, P (1, B) = {{2}, {3}, {4, 5, 6}} and P (3, B) = {{1, 2}, {4, 5, 6}}.
Using this partition indued by the levels struture for eah player, we
dene a new value on GLN , namely the Banzhaf levels value, whih is built
based on the Banzhaf-Owen value for games with a priori unions.
Denition 3.2. Given a ooperative game with levels struture of oop-
eration (N, v,B) ∈ GLN , the Banzhaf levels value, Ψ, is a value on GLN
dened, for every i ∈ N , as follows:
Ψi(N, v,B) =
∑
R⊆Mi
1
2mi
[v(TR ∪ i)− v(TR)] ,
where TR = ∪r∈RTr.
One an easily hek that the oalitions onsidered in eah marginal
ontribution, TR, are the oalitions for whih there exists a σ ∈ Ω(B) suh
that TR = P
σ
i . Therefore, exploiting the link between oalitions of elements
of P (i, B), for eah i ∈ N , and the permutations of Ω(B) we propose an
alternative expression of the Shapley levels value, Φ.
Remark 3.3. Given a ooperative game with levels struture of ooperation
(N, v,B) ∈ GLN ,
Φi(N, v,B) =
∑
R⊆Mi
ciR
|Ω(B)|
[v(TR ∪ i)− v(TR)] ,
where ciR = |{σ ∈ Ω(B) : P
σ
i = TR}|.
Note that the expressions of Φ and Ψ above lead to the Owen and
Banzhaf-Owen values respetively for levels struture of ooperation with
a single and trivial level.
4 Two parallel axiomati haraterizations
In this setion we haraterize both Φ and Ψ based on two dierent groups
of properties. The rst group applies only to games with the trivial levels
struture B = {B0} = {{i} : i ∈ N} and points out whih value on G
N
does
the value on GLN generalize, either the Shapley value or the Banzhaf value.
The seond group of properties desribes the performane of the values on
GLN with respet to the levels struture.
We onsider a number of properties that a value on GLN , f , might be
asked to satisfy. We start with a rst set of properties.
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eff A value f on GLN satises eieny if for every (N, v) ∈ GN ,∑
i∈N
fi(N, v, {B0}) = v(N).
2-eff A value f on GLN satises 2-eieny if for every (N, v) ∈ GN and
any i, j ∈ N ,
fi(N, v, {B0}) + fj(N, v, {B0}) = fp(N
ij, vij , {B0}
ij),
where (N ij , vij , {B0}
ij) is the game suh that player i and j have
merged into the new player p, i.e., N ij = (N \ {i, j}) ∪ p, {B0}
ij =
{{i} : i ∈ N ij}, and
vij(S) =
{
v(S) if p /∈ S
v((S \ p) ∪ i ∪ j) if p ∈ S
for every S ⊆ N ij.
dpp A value f on GLN satises the dummy player property if for every
(N, v) ∈ GN , if i ∈ N is a dummy player on (N, v),
fi(N, v, {B0}) = v(i).
sym A value f on GLN satises symmetry if for every (N, v) ∈ GN , if
i, j ∈ N are symmetri players on (N, v),
fi(N, v, {B0}) = fj(N, v, {B0}).
em A value f on GLN satises equal marginal ontributions if for every
(N, v), (N,w) ∈ GN and every i ∈ N suh that v(S ∪ i) − v(S) =
w(S ∪ i)− w(S) for all S ⊆ N \ i,
fi(N, v, {B0}) = fi(N,w, {B0}).
The above properties are standard in the literature for games without re-
strited ooperation. The eff property states that the whole worth available
is shared among the players. The 2-eff property is a ollusion neutrality
property whih states that the payo of two players does not hange if they
deide to artiially merge in a new player. Properties of this kind are used
in many haraterizations of the Banzhaf value, see for instane [10℄, [8℄ or
[11℄. The sym and dpp properties are lear by themselves. The property
of em states that if a player's marginal ontributions to any oalition in
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two games oinide, then her payos also oinide. Stronger versions of em
have been used in haraterizations of both Shapley and Banzhaf values and
are alled monotoniity [19℄. Even so some of the stated properties are also
satised by the two values onsidered in this paper for more general levels
strutures of ooperation than the trivial one, in order to obtain our results
there is no need to onsider stronger properties. Let us now onsider another
set of properties.
lgp A value f on GLN satises level game property if for every (N, v,B) ∈
GLN with B = {B0, . . . , Bk} and U ∈ Br for some r ∈ {1, · · · , k},∑
i∈U
fi(N, v,B) = f[U ]([Br], v
r, Br).
slgp A value f on GLN satises the singleton level game property if for
every (N, v,B) ∈ GLN with B = {B0, . . . , Bk} and U ∈ Br for some
r ∈ {1, · · · , k}, suh that U = {i} for some i ∈ N ,
fi(N, v,B) = f[U ]([Br], v
r, Br).
lb A value f on GLN satises level balaned ontributions if for every
(N, v,B) ∈ GLN with B = {B0, . . . , Bk} and i, j ∈ U ∈ B1,
fi(N, v,B)− fi(N, v,B
−j) = fj(N, v,B)− fj(N, v,B
−i).
lnid A value f on GLN satises level neutrality under individual desertion
if for every (N, v,B) ∈ GLN with B = {B0, . . . , Bk} and i, j ∈ U ∈ B1,
fi(N, v,B) = fi(N, v,B
−j).
The lgp is based on a property used in [13℄ to haraterize the Owen
value. It states that the total payo obtained by the members of a union in
a given level equals the payo obtained by the union when onsidering it as
a player in the orresponding level game. The slgp is a weaker version of
lgp, whih states that any union whih is omposed of a single player gets
the same payo in the original game and in the orresponding level game
when onsidering the union as a player. The idea behind slgp was also used
in [3℄ and more reently in [1℄.
The lb property is a reiproity property that states that the isolation
of a player from the levels struture aets the players in her same union
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of the rst level in the same amount as if it happens the other way around.
This property has been used in the ontext of games with a priori unions,
e.g. [16℄ and [3℄. The lnid property is a stronger version of lb and states
that the isolation of a player from the levels struture does not aet the
payos of the players whih are in her same union in all the levels. lnid
was introdued in [3℄ and also used in [1℄ to haraterize extensions of the
Banzhaf value to dierent lasses of games.
Next we state and prove the two haraterization results, one for the
Shapley levels value (Theorem 4.1) and one for the Banzhaf levels value
(Theorem 4.2). We start haraterizing the Shapley levels value.
Theorem 4.1. The Shapley levels value, Φ, is the unique value on GLN
satisfying eff, sym, em, lgp, and lb.
Proof. First we show that Φ satises the properties and then we prove
that it is the only value on GLN satisfying them.
(1) Existene. Note that, by denition, for every (N, v) ∈ GN , Φ(N, v, {B0}) =
φ(N, v). Hene, from [19℄ we have that Φ satises eff, sym, and em.
In the ase of lgp, let (N, v,B) ∈ GLN with B = {B0, . . . , Bk}, and
onsider some U ⊆ N suh that U ∈ Br for some r ∈ {1, · · · , k}. We
prove that lgp holds by indution over r. If r = 1, from the denition of the
indued partition, P (i, B)\{{j} : j ∈ U \ i} is the same partition for eah i ∈
U . Hene, take i ∈ U and let us dene P (U,B) = P (i, B)\{{j} : j ∈ U \ i},
mU = |P (U,B)|, and MU = {1, . . . ,mU}. Then,
(1)∑
i∈U
Φi(N, v,B) =
1
|Ω(B)|
∑
i∈U
∑
R⊆MU
∑
S⊆U\i
ciR+S ·(v(TR ∪ S ∪ i)− v(TR ∪ S)) ,
where ciR+S = |{σ ∈ Ω(B) : P
σ
i = TR ∪ S}| for eah i ∈ U , R ⊆ MU , and
S ⊆ U \ i. Sine U ∈ B1 and from the way Ω(B) is onstruted, for a given
R ⊆ MU and S ⊆ U \ i, there is an integer c
U
R suh that
cU
R
ci
R+S
=
(|U |−1
|S|
)
for
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all i ∈ U and all S ⊆ U \ i, and thus eq. (1) redues to∑
i∈U
Φi(N, v,B)
=
1
|Ω(B)|
∑
i∈U
∑
R⊆MU
∑
S⊆U\i
cUR(|U |−1
|S|
) · (v(TR ∪ S ∪ i)− v(TR ∪ S))
=
1
|Ω(B)|
∑
R⊆MU
cUR ·
∑
i∈U
∑
S⊆U\i
1(|U |−1
|S|
) · (v(TR ∪ S ∪ i)− v(TR ∪ S))
=
1
|Ω(B)|
∑
R⊆MU
cUR ·

 ∑
∅ S U

 |S|(|U |−1
|S|−1
) − |U \ S|(|U |−1
|S|
)

 v(TR ∪ S) + |U |v(TR ∪ U)− |U |v(TR)


=
1
|Ω(B)|
∑
R⊆MU
|U | · cUR · [(v(TR ∪ U)− v(TR))]
=
1
|Ω(B1)|
∑
R⊆M[U]
c
[U ]
R ·
[(
v1(TR ∪ [U ])− v
1(TR)
)]
= Φ[U ]([Br−1], v
r−1, Br−1),
where the fourth equality holds sine
|S|
(|U|−1|S|−1)
− |U\S|
(|U|−1|S| )
= 0 for eah ∅  S  U
and the fth equality is explained as follows. From the denition of the in-
dued partition, it is straightforward to hek that P (U,B) = P ([U ], B1).
Moreover, let c
[U ]
R = |{σ ∈ Ω(B1) : P
σ
[U ] = TR}|. Then, it an be easily
heked that
c
[U]
R
cU
R
= |U | ·
|Ω(B1)|
|Ω(B)| , whih ompletes the rst step of the indu-
tion.
Now suppose that for any S ∈ Br−1,
∑
i∈S Φi(N, v,B) = Φ[S]([Br−1], v
r−1, Br−1),
and let U ∈ Br. Then∑
i∈U
Φi(N, v,B) =
∑
S∈Br−1
S⊆U
∑
i∈S
Φi(N, v,B) =
∑
S∈Br−1
S⊆U
Φ[S]([Br−1], v
r−1, Br−1)
by the indution hypothesis. Observe that ([Br−1], v
r−1, Br−1) is a levels
struture of ooperation of k−r+1 levels. Hene, we an follow the argument
from eq. (1) with [Br−1] instead N and [S] instead i to obtain∑
S∈Br−1
S⊆U
Φ[S]([Br−1], v
r−1, Br−1) = Φ[U ]([Br], v
r, Br),
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whih ompletes the indution.
In the ase of lb, let (N, v,B) ∈ GLN with B = {B0, . . . , Bk} and
i, j ∈ U ∈ B1. Then, it is easy to hek that P (i, B) ∪ i = P (j,B) ∪ j.
Hene, let us dene P (ij,B) = P (i, B) \ j = P (j,B) \ i, mij = |P (ij,B)|,
and Mij = {1, . . . ,mij}. Then,
Φi(N, v,B)− Φi(N, v,B
−j)
=
∑
R⊆Mij
ciR+j
|Ω(B)|
(v(TR ∪ j ∪ i)− v(TR ∪ j)) +
ciR
|Ω(B)|
(v(TR ∪ i)− v(TR))
−
∑
R⊆Mij
ci,−jR+j
|Ω(B−j)|
(v(TR ∪ j ∪ i)− v(TR ∪ j))+
ci,−jR
|Ω(B−j)|
(v(TR ∪ i)− v(TR))
=
∑
R⊆Mij
[(
ciR+j
|Ω(B)|
−
ci,−jR+j
|Ω(B−j)|
)
(v(TR ∪ j ∪ i)− v(TR ∪ j))
+
(
ciR
|Ω(B)|
−
ci,−jR
|Ω(B−j)|
)
(v(TR ∪ i)− v(TR))
]
,
where for eah R ⊆ Mij , c
i,−j
R = |{σ ∈ Ω(B
−j) : P σi = TR}| and c
i,−j
R+j =
|{σ ∈ Ω(B−j) : P σi = TR ∪ j}|. Note that by denition, c
i
R = c
j
R, c
i
R+j =
cjR+i, c
i,−j
R = c
j,−i
R , and c
i,−j
R+j = c
j,−i
R+i. We additionally laim (see a proof in
the Appendix) that
(2)
ciR + c
i
R+j
|Ω(B)|
=
ci,−jR + c
i,−j
R+j
|Ω(B−j)|
.
Then Φi(N, v,B) − Φi(N, v,B
−j) depends on i in the same way it depends
on j, whih onludes the proof.
(2) Uniqueness. In [19℄ it is proved that any value on GLN that satises
eff, sym, and em is unique for games with the trivial levels struture of
ooperation. In other words, let f1 and f2 be two values on GLN satisfying
eff, sym, and em, then
f1(N, v, {B0}) = f
2(N, v, {B0}) = φ(N, v) for any (N, v) ∈ G
N .
Hene, let f1 and f2 be two values on GLN satisfying lgp and lb
and suh that f1(N, v, {B0}) = f
2(N, v, {B0}) for all (N, v) ∈ G
N
. We
prove that for any (N, v,B) ∈ GLN , with B = {B0, . . . , Bk}, f
1(N, v,B) =
f2(N, v,B) by indution on the number k of levels of B. The ase k =
13
1 is proved in [16℄. Now suppose that f1(N, v,B) = f2(N, v,B) for any
(N, v,B) ∈ GLN suh that |B| ≤ k and let (N, v,B) ∈ GLN with |B| = k+1
and i ∈ N . We prove that f1i (N, v,B) = f
2
i (N, v,B) by a seond indution
on u = |U |, where i ∈ U ∈ B1 ∈ B. If u = 1, i.e. U = {i}, sine f
1
and f2
satisfy lgp, we have
f1i (N, v,B) = f
1
[U ]([B1], v
r, B1) = f
2
[U ]([B1], v
r, B1) = f
2
i (N, v,B),
where the seond equality holds by the rst indution hypothesis. Hene,
suppose that f1i (N, v,B) = f
2
i (N, v,B) for any (N, v,B) ∈ GL
N
, with |B| =
k+1 and any i ∈ U ∈ B1 that satises |U | ≤ u. Now suppose that |U | = u+1
and let j ∈ U \ i. Sine f1 and f2 satisfy lb, we have
(3) f1i (N, v,B)− f
1
j (N, v,B) = f
1
i (N, v,B
−j)− f1j (N, v,B
−i)
= f2i (N, v,B
−j)− f2j (N, v,B
−i) = f2i (N, v,B)− f
2
j (N, v,B),
where the seond equality follows from the seond indution hypothesis, sine
i ∈ U \ {j} ∈ B1,−j and j ∈ U \ {i} ∈ B1,−i with |U \ {j}| = |U \ {i}| = u,
where |B−j| = |B−i| = k + 1. Now, adding up eq. (3) for eah j ∈ U \ i, we
have
(4)
(t+ 1)f1i (N, v,B)−
∑
j∈U
f1j (N, v,B) = (t+ 1)f
2
i (N, v,B)−
∑
j∈U
f2j (N, v,B).
Finally, by lgp we have that
(5)∑
j∈U
f1j (N, v,B) = f
1
[U ]([B1], v
r, B1) = f
2
[U ]([B1], v
r, B1) =
∑
j∈U
f2j (N, v,B),
where the seond equality holds by the rst indution hypothesis sine |B1| =
k. Combining eq. (4) and (5) we obtain f1i (N, v,B) = f
2
i (N, v,B), whih
ompletes the proof. 
In the next theorem we haraterize the Banzhaf levels value with a
set of six properties whih are easily omparable to the properties used to
haraterize the Shapley levels value.
Theorem 4.2. The Banzhaf levels value, Ψ, is the unique value on GLN
satisfying 2-eff, dpp, sym, em, slgp, and lnid.
Proof. As before, rst we show that Ψ satises the properties and then
we prove that it is the only value satisfying them.
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(1) Existene. Note that, by denition for every (N, v) ∈ GN , Ψ(N, v, {B0}) =
ψ(N, v). Hene, from [11℄ we have that Ψ satises 2-eff, dpp, sym, and
em.
In the ase of slgp, the proof follows immediately taking into aount the
fat that for any (N, v,B) ∈ GLN with B = {B0, . . . , Bk} and U = {i} ∈ Br
for some r ∈ {1, · · · , k}, P (i, B) = P ([U ], Br).
In the ase of lnid, we only need to hek that for any (N, v,B) ∈ GLN
with B = {B0, . . . , Bk}, and any i, j ∈ U ∈ B1, P (i, B) = P (i, B
−j), whih
follows from the denition of the partition indued by B.
(2) Uniqueness. From the haraterization in [11℄, we have that any value
on GLN that satises 2-eff, dpp, sym, and em is unique for games with
the trivial levels struture of ooperation. In other words, let f1 and f2 be
two values on GLN satisfying 2-eff, dpp, sym, and em, then
f1(N, v, {B0}) = f
2(N, v, {B0}) = ψ(N, v) for any (N, v) ∈ G
N .
Now let f1 and f2 be two values on GLN satisfying slgp and lnid suh
that f1(N, v, {B0}) = f
2(N, v, {B0}) for all (N, v) ∈ G
N
. We prove that for
any (N, v,B) ∈ GLN , with B = {B0, . . . , Bk}, f
1(N, v,B) = f2(N, v,B) by
indution on the number k of levels of B. The ase k = 1 is proved in [2℄.
Hene suppose that f1(N, v,B) = f2(N, v,B) for any (N, v,B) ∈ GLN suh
that |B| ≤ k and let (N, v,B) ∈ GLN suh that |B| = k+1. Let i ∈ U ∈ B1
be an arbitrary player that belongs to an arbitrary union of the rst level.
We prove that f1i (N, v,B) = f
2
i (N, v,B) by a seond indution on u = |U |.
If u = 1, i.e. U = {i}, sine f1 and f2 satisfy slgp, we have
f1i (N, v,B) = f
1
[U ]([B1], v
1, B1) = f
2
[U ]([B1], v
1, B1) = f
2
i (N, v,B),
where the seond equality holds by the rst indution hypothesis sine B1 ∈
L(N) is a levels struture with k levels. Now suppose that f1i (N, v,B) =
f2i (N, v,B) for any (N, v,B) suh that |B| = k + 1 and any i ∈ U ∈ B1
where |U | ≤ u. Finally, suppose that |U | = u+1 and let j ∈ U \ i. Sine f1
and f2 satisfy lnid we have
f1i (N, v,B) = f
1
i (N, v,B
−j) = f2i (N, v,B
−j) = f2i (N, v,B),
where the seond equality holds by the seond indution hypothesis sine
i ∈ U \ j ∈ B−j1 , B
−j
1 has k + 1 levels of ooperation and |U \ j| = u, whih
onludes the proof. 
Finally, we hek that the proposed properties are independent axioms,
and hene we annot drop any of them from the haraterizations. We start
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examining the properties used for the haraterization of the Shapley levels
value, Φ.
Remark 4.3. Independene of properties for Theorem 4.1
(i) The value on GLN , g, given by g(N, v,B) = 0 for all (N, v,B) ∈ GLN
satises sym, em, lgp, lb but not eff.
(ii) Let g be the value on GLN dened as follows:
• If N = {i, j} and B = {{i}, {j}},
gi(N, v,B) =
3
4
(v(N)− v(j)) +
1
4
v(i) and
gj(N, v,B) =
1
4
(v(N)− v(i)) +
3
4
v(j).
• Otherwise, g(N, v,B) = Φ(N, v,B).
Thus, g satises eff, em, lgp, lb, but not sym.
(iii) Consider the value on GLN , g, given by
g(N, v,B) =
{
Φ(N, v,B) if (N, v,B) /∈ C
ai(N,v)1i(N,v) if (N, v,B) ∈ C
where
C =
{
(N, v,B) ∈ GLN : v = biτ i + (ai − bi)δN ,
for some i = i(N, v) ∈ N and 0 ≤ bi < ai
}
suh that for every S ⊆ N ,
τ i(S) =
{
1 if i ∈ S
0 otherwise
and δN (S) =
{
1 if S = N
0 otherwise
,
and 1k ∈ R
n
is suh that 1k(l) = 1 if k = l and 1k(l) = 0 if k 6= l. Then
g satises eff, sym, lgp, lb, but not em.
(iv) The value onGLN , g, given by g(N, v,B) = φ(N, v) for all (N, v,B) ∈
GLN satises eff, sym, em, lb, but not lb.
(v) Let g be the value on GLN dened as follows:
• If N = {i, j} and B = {{{i}, {j}}, N}, g(N, v,B) = (v(N)2 ,
v(N)
2 ).
• Otherwise, g(N, v,B) = Φ(N, v,B).
Thus, g satises eff, sym, em, lgp but not lb.
Lastly, we examine the properties used for the haraterization of the
Banzhaf levels Ψ.
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Remark 4.4. Independene of axioms for Theorem 4.2
(i) The value on GLN , g, given by
gi(N, v,B) =
∑
R⊆Mi
|R|!(mi − |R| − 1)!
mi!
(v(TR ∪ i)− v(TR)) ,
satises dpp, sym, em, slgp, lnid but not 2-eff.
(ii) The value on GLN , g, given by g(N, v,B) = 0 for all (N, v,B) ∈ GLN
satises 2-eff, sym, em, slgp, lnid, but not dpp.
(iii) Let g be the value on GLN dened as follows:
• If N = {i, j} and B = {{i}, {j}},
gi(N, v,B) =
3
4
(v(N)− v(j)) +
1
4
v(i) and
gj(N, v,B) =
1
4
(v(N)− v(i)) +
3
4
v(j).
• Otherwise, g(N, v,B) = Ψ(N, v,B).
Thus, g satises 2-eff, dpp, em, slgp, lnid, but not sym.
(iv) The value on GLN , g, given by
g(N, v,B) =
{
Ψ(N, v,B) if (N, v,B) /∈ C
0 if (N, v,B) ∈ C
where C = {(N, v,B) ∈ GLN : v = aSδS, for some S ⊆ N}, satises 2-eff,
dpp, sym, slgp, lnid, but not em.
(v) The value onGLN , g, given by g(N, v,B) = ψ(N, v) for all (N, v,B) ∈
GLN satises 2-eff, dpp, sym, em, lnid, but not slgp.
(vi) The value on GLN , g, given by
gi(N, v,B) =
∑
R⊆Mi
1
2mi−|TR∩Uk|
·
|TR ∩ Uk|!(|Uk \ TR| − 1)!
|Uk|!
(v(TR ∪ i)− v(TR)) ,
satises 2-eff, dpp, sym, em, slgp, but not lnid, where reall that Uk
is the union of the k-th level to whih player i belongs.
It should be pointed out that, from the proofs above it follows that in
both Theorems, the group of properties that apply only for the trivial levels
struture an be replaed by any other group of properties that haraterize
either the Shapley or the Banzhaf value.
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5 Conlusions and an example
In the present paper we have proposed a new value for games with levels
struture of ooperation and we have provided parallel haraterizations of
this new value, the Banzhaf levels value, and the Shapley levels value. Sine
the main properties used in both haraterizations are logially ompara-
ble, our paper serves in the purpose of deiding whih value to use in any
framework of restrited ooperation given by a sequene of union levels.
We onlude the paper by examining an example to help us illustrate
the use of the two dierent values in a deision problem. Before doing so,
we make a omment on the validity of the appliation of the Banzhaf lev-
els value. [9℄ laim that, in the ontext of voting games with a single level
struture of ooperation and the Banzhaf levels value, only omparisons be-
tween players that belong to the same union of the rst level are meaningful.
The reason why they state so is that the number that Φ assigns to player
i an be interpreted as the mathematial expetation of the deisiveness of
player i when onsidering the probability distribution dened on the set of
permutations of players onditional to the partition indued by the levels
struture on player i. Sine players that belong to dierent unions give rise
to dierent indued partitions, their orresponding probability distributions
are dierent and hene [9℄ onlude that they annot be ompared. Never-
theless, when the levels struture of ooperation is pin down and the players
annot behave strategially and hange their position in the struture, as it
is the ase in the example below, we an do ompare the values of players
belonging to dierent unions, even in the ase of simple games. We argue
that even so the probability distribution of eah agent is dierent, all of them
are obtained from the same xed struture following the same rules, whih
an be seen as publi knowledge. Therefore, we may interpret the Banzhaf
levels value as the subjetive expetation of any player about the outome of
the game, provided the following ondition holds: all agents believe that, for
any arbitrary given agent, all possible oalitions that may form before she
takes a deision -whih may be dierent depending on the player onsidered-
are equiprobable.
Example 5.1. Consider a grid omputing network to whih some departments
of several universities ontribute with resoures, e.g., memory, databases or
proessing apaity. The whole network resoures are used for purposes
of alulations demanding massive levels of resoures suh as limate pre-
ditions. The departments involved are willing to use the grid omputing
network for their investigations and the problem arises when more than one
department simultaneously request aess to the ommon resoures, whih
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an only be aessed by one department at a time.
Moreover, onsider a numerial example where the amount of resoures
that eah department ontributes with an be measured, e.g., either TB or
Ghz. The total amount of resoures add up to 41 units that are provided by
10 departments namely A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I and J, whih respetively
ontribute 3, 1, 2, 10, 3, 5, 2, 3, 2, 10 units.
In order to measure the ontribution of eah department to the network
we assume that a grid omputing network needs a minimum of 21 units to
operate. Hene, any group of departments whose resoures add up to 21
units or more ould form a smaller network. Even though all departments
prefer to be part of a network as big as possible, we onsider this possibility
in order to measure the bargaining strength of eah department.
The situation desribed so far an be modeled by a simple game (N, v),
where N is the set of departments and the harateristi funtion v(S) equals
1 if the aggregate amount of resoures of oalition S is at least equal to 21 and
0 otherwise. Therefore, the priority rule needed to deide whih department
will use the grid rst an be based on either the Shapley or the Banzhaf
value, φ or ψ respetively. More preisely, we rst normalize the Banzhaf
value and the value of eah department is interpreted as the probability -
heneforth just priority- that the orresponding department an make use of
the ommon resoures when all departments simultaneously request aess.
These values (φ and ψ) are depited in Table 5.1.
However, eah department involved is part of a university whih, in turn,
is in a given ountry. It may happen that when bargaining for the pri-
ority the departments are not autonomous anymore and need the permis-
sion of the university or ountry they belong to. If we take into aount
these restritions, a levels struture of ooperation emerges naturally, and
hene, the Shapley and Banzhaf levels values, Φ and Ψ, ould be used
as basis for a priority rule. Consider for instane, that the 10 depart-
ments are part of 6 dierent universities whih, in turn, are in 4 ountries.
More preisely, suppose there is the following levels struture of ooperation,
{{A}, {B,C}, {D}, {E,F}, {G,H, I}, {J}} and {{A,B,C}, {D,E,F}, {G,H, I},
{J}}, i.e. for instane Dept. B and Dept. C belong to the same university,
whih at its turn it is loated in the same region as the university whih
Dept. A belongs to.
Table 5.1 below omprises the dierent values onsidered in this paper
2
.
From Table 5.1, it follows that when onsidering the restritions given
2
By f¯ we denote the normalized f value. The dierent values have been alulated
using a MATLAB
© routine, whih an be provided by the authors upon request.
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Dep. Resoures φ Φ ψ Ψ ψ Ψ
A 3 0.0690 0.0833 0.1523 0.1250 0.0736 0.0800
B 1 0.0341 0.0417 0.0724 0.0625 0.0358 0.0400
C 2 0.0405 0.0417 0.0898 0.0625 0.0434 0.0400
D 10 0.2579 0.2500 0.4961 0.3750 0.2396 0.2400
E 3 0.0690 0.0417 0.1523 0.0625 0.0736 0.0400
F 5 0.1214 0.2083 0.2773 0.3125 0.1340 0.2000
G 2 0.0405 0.0278 0.0898 0.0625 0.0434 0.0400
H 3 0.0690 0.1110 0.1523 0.1875 0.0736 0.1200
I 2 0.0405 0.0278 0.0898 0.0625 0.0434 0.0400
J 10 0.2579 0.1667 0.4961 0.2500 0.2396 0.1600
Table 1: The dierent measures of priority.
by the levels struture of ooperation the priorities hange signiantly. For
instane, a relevant suh dierene the hange in the priority assigned to
Dep. J. When the departments are onsidered autonomous it is given top
priority together with Dep. D. However, when the universities and ountries
are taken into aount it ranks third, having Dep. F priority over Dep. J.
This is explained by the fat that even so Dep. J is one of the departments
whose ontribution is highest, the aggregate resoures of its ountry are not
so high ompared to the aggregate resoures of the remaining ountries.
Finally, the dierene between Φ and Ψ reveals intensely on the values of
Dept. E and Dept. I, sine Ψ gives equal priority to both of them, whereas
Φ doubles the value of Dept. E.
6 Appendix
Proof of the laim in the Proof of Theorem 4.1.
Let (N, v,B) ∈ GLN with B = {B0, . . . , Bk}, i, j ∈ U1 ⊆ ... ⊆ Uk
with Ur ∈ Br for eah r ∈ {1, · · · , k}, and R ⊆ Mij . Let us dene, for
r ∈ {1, · · · , k},
λrR = |{σ ∈ Ωr(B) : P
σ
i = TR}|+ |{σ ∈ Ωr(B) : P
σ
i = TR ∪ j}| , and
λ−rR = |{σ ∈ Ωr(B
−j) : P σi = TR}|+ |{σ ∈ Ωr(B
−j) : P σi = TR ∪ j}|.
Observe that λ1R = c
i
R + c
i
R+j and λ
−1
R = c
i,−j
R + c
i.−j
R+j . We prove that
λrR
|Ωr(B)|
=
λ−r
R
|Ωr(B−j)|
for all r ∈ {1, · · · , k} by bakward indution on r. For
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eah r ∈ {1, · · · , k}, let br = |Br|, ur = |Ur|, A
r = |{U ∈ Br \ Ur : U ⊆
Ur+1 and U ∩ TR = ∅}|, and B
r = |{U ∈ Br \ Ur : U ⊆ Ur+1 and U ⊆ TR}|.
Reall that by onveniene Uk+1 = N . Observe that A
k + Bk + 1 = bk and
that, for eah r ∈ {1, · · · , k}, |Ur ∩ TR|+ |Ur \ TR| = ur.
We start proving the ase r = k. Reall that Uk ∈ Bk is suh that
i, j ∈ Uk. In partiular, i, j ∈ Uk \ TR and thus |Uk \ TR| ≥ 2. By denition
of λrR,
λkR =
∏
S∈Bk\{Uk}
|S|! · Ak! ·Bk! · (|Uk ∩ TR|)! · (|Uk \ TR| − 1)!
+
∏
S∈Bk\{Uk}
|S|! ·Ak! · Bk! · (|Uk ∩ TR|+ 1)! · (|Uk \ TR| − 2)!
=
∏
S∈Bk\{Uk}
|S|! ·Ak! ·Bk! · (|Uk ∩ TR|)! · (|Uk \ TR| − 2)! · uk.
Similarly, by denition of λ−kR ,
λ−kR =
∏
S∈Bk\{Uk}
|S|! · (Ak + 1)! ·Bk! · (|Uk ∩ TR|)! · (|Uk \ TR| − 2)!
+
∏
S∈Bk\{Uk}
|S|! · Ak! · (Bk + 1)! · (|Uk ∩ TR|)! · (|Uk \ TR| − 2)!
=
∏
S∈Bk\{Uk}
|S|! ·Ak! ·Bk! · (|Uk ∩ TR|)! · (|Uk \ TR| − 2)! · (bk + 1).
Hene, for every R ⊆ Mij ,
λkR
λ−k
R
= uk
bk+1
. To onlude with the rst step
of the indution one an easily hek that
Ωk(B)
Ωk(B−j)
= uk
bk+1
.
Now suppose that for every R ⊆ Mij ,
|Ωr+1(B)|
|Ωr+1(B−j )|
=
λr+1
R
λ
−,r+1
R
, for some
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r ∈ {2, . . . , k}. By denition of λkR,
λrR
λr+1R
=
∏
S∈Br+1\Ur+1

h(S)!|S|! ·
∏
S′∈Br
S′⊆S
|S′|!

 · Ar! · Br! · ∏
S′∈Br
S′⊆Ur+1\Ur
|S′|!
·
(|Ur ∩ TR|)! · (|Ur \ TR| − 1)! + (|Ur ∩ TR|+ 1)! · (|Ur \ TR| − 1)!
(|Ur+1 ∩ TR|)! · (|Ur+1 \ TR| − 1)! + (|Ur+1 ∩ TR|+ 1)! · (|Ur+1 \ TR| − 2)!
=
∏
S∈Br+1\Ur+1

h(S)!|S|! ·
∏
S′∈Br
S′⊆S
|S′|!

 ·Ar! ·Br! · ∏
S′∈Br
S′⊆Ur+1\Ur
|S′|!
·
(|Ur ∩ TR|)! · (|Ur \ TR| − 2)!
(|Ur+1 ∩ TR|)! · (|Ur+1 \ TR| − 2)!
·
ur+1
ur
,
where h(S) = | {S′ ∈ Br : S
′ ⊆ S} | for eah S ∈ Br+1. Similarly, by deni-
tion of λ−kR ,
λ−,rR
λ−,r+1R
=
∏
S∈Br+1\Ur+1

h(S)!|S|! ·
∏
S′∈Br
S′⊆S
|S′|!

 ·Ar! ·Br! · ∏
S′∈Br
S′⊆Ur+1\Ur
|S′|!
·
(|Ur ∩ TR|)! · (|Ur \ TR| − 2)!
(|Ur+1 ∩ TR|)! · (|Ur+1 \ TR| − 2)!
.
Combining the two above expressions we obtain
(6)
λrR
λ−,rR
=
λr+1R
λ−,r+1R
·
ur
ur+1
.
Furthermore,
|Ωr(B)|
|Ωr+1(B)|
=
∏
S∈Br+1\Ur+1

h(S)!|S|! ·
∏
S′∈Br
S′⊆S
|S′|!

·h(Ur+1)!ur+1! ·


∏
S′∈Br\Ur
S′⊆Ur+1
|S′|!

·ur!,
and
|Ωr(B
−j)|
|Ωr+1(B−j)|
=
∏
S∈Br+1\Ur+1

h(S)!|S|! ·
∏
S′∈Br
S′⊆S
|S′|!

· h(Ur+1)!(ur+1 − 1)! ·


∏
S′∈Br\Ur
S′⊆Ur+1
|S′|!

·(ur−1)!.
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Thus
(7)
|Ωr(B)|
|Ωr(B−j)|
=
|Ωr+1(B)|
|Ωr+1(B−j)|
·
ur
ur+1
.
Hene, from eq. (6) and (7), using the indution hypothesis we obtain
λrR
|Ωr(B)|
=
λ−,rR
|Ωr(B−j)|
,
whih onludes the proof. 
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